Introduction: Is it worth reducing inequalities in health?
The set of statistics presented here attempts to show how closely the distribution of voting mirrors the distribution of premature mortality in Britain. The paper goes on to show how spatial inequalities in mortality are reflected in the spatial distribution of members of parliament and, in particular, Cabinet Ministers. The paper argues that, given the unequal life chances of their own constituents, reducing inequalities in health in Britain should be a priority for our present government. Thus it may be a little surprising that the Green Paper on health, produced just before this paper was first presented (DoH 1998), set no explicit targets to reduce the inequalities which are described here. Similarly the government's independent inquiry into inequalities in health , published in November 1998, did not recommend specific targets and did not prioritise its recommendations (Davey Smith et. al. 1998) . The government has still to respond to the inquiry's report other than in saying it would form a "key input" to policy, and this was only a press comment from Frank Dobson, Secretary of state for health.
The paper shows that every year analysed in the 1990s 119 people die unexpectedly and prematurely in Frank Dobson's constituency of Holburn and St. Pancras. This is because people aged under 65 have a mortality ratio 50% above the national average there, the 21st highest in the country and the 2nd highest amongst Cabinet Ministers. In the 1980s Holburn and St. Pancras had a mortality ratio for this age group that was 38% above the national average, 49 fewer people died unexpectedly a year under the age of 65. Inequalities in mortality are increasing, with the effects being seen most clearly amongst the constituencies of the people who voted for the ministers of the current government. Since Frank Dobson became MP for Holburn and St. Pancras in 1979 at least 1,500 more of his constituents will have died prematurely than in the average constituency in Britain. The primary reason for this level of inequality in health is inequalities in wealth, most obviously reflected through levels of poverty. In Frank Dobson's constituency 36% of households and 56% of households with children live in poverty, compared to 21% and 27% nationally (using Breadline Britain methodology).
Given such a long legacy of the effects of poverty on ill health amongst the Cabinet's constituents, a naive analyst might expect government policy to have concentrated on the eradication of poverty and inequalities in health in Britain. This paper concludes by suggesting an electoral explanation as to why reducing inequalities in general may not be a real political priority for this government. Perhaps ministers, and Members of Parliament in general, need to be reminded of the extent of inequalities in health, precisely who those inequalities affect, how they are worsening, and why they first fought to gain office?
British Democracy is weakest where peoples' lives are shortest Dorling 1996, 1997 for further details). The mortality data is updated later to 1995 for the constituencies of Ministers and Shadow Ministers. Mortality below age 65 is termed premature mortality from here on. All the constituencies of mainland Britain were then ranked and divided into ten groups -each containing almost the same number of electors. These are termed decile groups from here on. The first decile group is made up of those constituencies which contain the 10% of the electorate living in areas with the highest premature mortality ratios (these constituencies are listed in Table 4 ). The second contains the tenth of the population living in constituencies with the next highest mortality ratios and so on, up to decile 10 which contains the last tenth of the population living in the constituencies with the lowest premature mortality ratios. Table 1 requires some explanation. When we compare these decile groups of constituencies we are not comparing exactly the same numbers of adults as not all adults in Britain are registered to vote. The second column in Table 1 , and Figure 1 , shows how many adults actually lived in each decile group in 1991. Note that the 40% of the electorate living in areas with the highest premature mortality ratios (decile groups 1 to 4) contain disproportionate numbers of adults. Dorling, D. (1998) Whose voters suffer if inequalities in health remain? Journal of Contemporary Health, 7, 50-54. The third column in Table 1 shows the proportion of premature deaths (under age 65 in these areas) which would not have occurred had the mortality ratios in the areas been the same as for England and Wales as a whole. This ranges from there being a third more premature deaths between 1981 and 1992 in decile group 1 than would be expected, to there being a quarter fewer in decile group 10. These statistics are put another, and more direct, way in the next column in the table, which shows how in the worst decile 5,031 more people die each year under age 65 than we would expect under equality. Because English and Welsh rates are being used to derive the expected number of deaths in an area, the ratios for Britain are slightly higher than one as they include Scotland where mortality rates are higher than in England and Wales. Figure 2 shows the distribution of excess death rates by decile area and demonstrates that there is a near log-linear continuum. Britain is not divided into areas with poor health and areas with good health, but contains a continuum of places which, when graphed, show a neat pecking order in terms of life chances. The people of decile group 1 are slightly out of linewith the jump in mortality from the second to the worst set of areas being greater than that between any other groups. This widening of the gap between the worst areas and the average opened up during the 1980s, and such spatial polarization in life chances had not been seen before then in Britain (Dorling, 1997) . The fifth column in Table 1 gives the abstention rate (proportion of the registered electorate not casting a valid vote) in the constituencies in each decile group at the 1997 general election, while the final three columns show the proportion of the electorate who chose to vote for each of the three major parties. In the first seven decile areas, representing 70% of the electors of Britain, the largest proportion of electors voted for (new) Labour, while in the last three decile group the Conservatives were most popular. The abstention rate and the Labour vote rose as mortality rose, while the Conservative and Liberal votes fell. Figure 3 shows how strong the relationship is between the abstention and mortality rates in decile groups. For every extra 600 people who died prematurely in a decile area every year between 1981 and 1992, another 1% of the electorate chose not to vote at the general election of 1997. Because the number of voters is so large and the number of deaths so (relatively) small, this relationship cannot be due to excess mortality rates in an area leading to inflated electoral rolls (although dead people can remain on the electoral roll for many months after they have died). The distribution of support for the three main parties amongst those who do choose to vote for them is shown in Figure 4 . 
Decimal Group
Lib Dem
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The proportions of the electorate shown in Table 1 do not sum to 100% because voting for the minor political parties has not been included on that table. The table also shows, in its last column, the proportion of adults in each decile area who were not registered to vote, which is highest in decile group 1. When these adults are added to those who are registered but choose not to vote we see that the most popular "choice" for adults in the tenth of Britain with the highest premature mortality ratios, chosen by 40%, was not to take part in the political process at all. British democracy is weakest where peoples' lives are shortest. If instead of looking at votes we look at seats, and the Party elected, we see a very different picture. Despite a minority of adults voting for Labour in the constituencies with the highest mortality rates (and less than two fifths of those who did vote, voting for that party -see Table 1 ), they won 67 of the 70 seats. Table 3 shows how many seats each party won in each decile group of constituencies. Labour have a majority of the seats in the 70% of the population with the highest premature mortality rates and the Conservatives have a majority in the remaining 30%. The Liberal Democrats had their greatest success at the interface of these two groups (winning 12 of the 63 constituencies in decile group 7) reflecting their political position between the main two parties. Figure 5 shows the dominance of Labour more clearly. Politically, the people living in the half of Britain with higher than average premature mortality ratios are represented almost exclusively by one political party: Labour. Since the Labour party have always represented poorer people and poorer people are more likely to die prematurely from the effects of poverty, this relationship is not surprising. However, it is interesting to see that the population of the tenth of the country with the highest premature mortality ratios (and, when we look at other measures the highest levels of poverty overall) are represented by the highest number of Cabinet Ministers and parliamentary secretaries of all the groups being analysed here. Smith (National Heritage) . These are the people who run government ministries, who sit in Cabinet and who are empowered to make the decisions which can either harm or help peoples' lives. Labour have a monopoly of the population with premature mortality and Labour Ministers represent an even more marginal set of constituents than do their parliamentary party members. In general, the higher the number of premature deaths, the safer the seat and the more senior the Labour politician elected.
The mortality figures for the constituencies of every member of the Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet are shown in Table Five . These include the rank of their constituency in terms of the premature mortality rate of their constituents, the proportion of premature deaths that could be avoided if mortality ratios were equalized, and how many excess deaths a year this proportion represents. Every Cabinet Minister who has a constituency represents people in areas of above average premature mortality. Every day between 1981 and 1992, an extra three people died below the age of 65 in the current Cabinet's constituencies than in the country as a whole. Put another way there were ten thousand additional premature deaths in the 1980s decade in the current Cabinet's twenty constituencies alone. The Prime Minister, Tony Blair's constituents experience 47 more deaths under 65 a year than do the voters of an average constituency (although the premature death rate in his constituency is average for a member of the Cabinet). The Conservative Shadow Cabinet represent a set of seats which could not be more different to those of the Cabinet (See Table 5 ). All Shadow Ministers represent constituents living in areas of low premature mortality. This is not true of all Conservative MPs, but Shadow Ministers tend to be the more focussed of their colleagues and to secure safe Conservative seats where premature mortality rates are lowest. Labour Ministers, represent some of the safest Labour seats in the country which hence have some of the highest mortality rates. In essence people who are well off tend to vote Conservative and tend also to live longer because of their material advantages. Successful politicians in Britain manage to secure the safer seats and hence the widest inequalities in life chances can be seen between the people who live in the constituencies of the Cabinet and those of the Shadow Cabinet.
Changes in the Cabinet 1997 to 1999
The tables show above refer to the Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet that were in place immediately after the 
Changes in mortality 1981 to 1995
It would be wrong to assume that Cabinet reshuffles have actually resulted in the constituents of the Labour Cabinet being slightly better off in terms of indicators of their health because, of course, the geography of health changes, just as the geography of Cabinet Ministers' constituents change. We will not have figures on mortality for 1999 until about 2001, but what we can do is look at the most recent data we do have (for 1991-95) by the current Cabinet and this is shown in table 7a. Because inequalities in mortality continued to rise into the 1990s this, most recent table, by the most recent Cabinet, produces the most extreme picture of variation across the country The biggest relative increases in mortality ratios have been in the constituencies of the Secretary of state for Scotland (Donald Dewar), the Secretary of state for health (Frank Dobson) and the deputy Prime Minister (John Prescott). By 1995 over one thousand extra people a year were dying early in the Cabinet's constituencies, or more than one a week for each Cabinet Minister (compared to the average for England and Wales). The changes were less conspicuous for the Shadow Cabinet, although the largest relative falls in mortality were for the constituents of three new Shadow Cabinet Ministers: the Shadow Minister for constitutional affairs (Liam Fox), the Shadow Secretary of state for agriculture, fisheries and farming (Tim Yeo) and the Shadow leader of the house (George Young -who was Secretary of state for defence). In short, the position of the constituents of the Labour Cabinet has deteriorated over time, while the advantage of the Shadow Cabinet's constituents has been maintained. Britain is become even more unequal in terms of the life chances of its people and some of the worst aspects of this rising inequality is reflected by contrasting the day to day experiences of the constituents of the people who are, nominally, in charge of the country or in opposition to the government.
The 1997 general election was not won by Labour, but lost by the Conservatives
The medical-political geography of Britain described above may not be too surprising to many readers, although the degree of polarization between those living in areas of poor and good health may be larger than expected. What may be more interesting is to look at how the Labour Party won the last general election with such a huge landslide, in terms of the premature mortality rates of its constituents. Table 7 presents the swings in aggregate votes for the main parties between 1992 and 1997 and the changes in abstentions and in the electorate, in terms of the premature mortality ratios experienced in the preceding 12 years (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) . To be able to conduct this analysis, the results of the 1992 general election had to be reassigned to 1997 constituencies. This work was conducted by David Rossiter (see Pattie et al. 1996 ,1997 . 1  6%  1%  -7%  -2%  0%  2%  -2%  2  7%  3%  -9%  -2%  0%  2%  -2%  3  7%  3%  -11%  -1%  0%  2%  -2%  4  7%  4%  -10%  -2%  0%  2%  -1%  5  6%  5%  -11%  -2%  0%  2%  0%  6  6%  7%  -12%  -3%  0%  2%  1%  7  6%  6%  -12%  -3%  0%  2%  1%  8  6%  6%  -13%  -2%  0%  3%  2%  9  6%  6%  -13%  -2%  0%  3%  3%  10  5%  6%  -13%  -1%  0%  3%  2%  Britain  6%  4% -11% -2% 0% 2% 0% Notes 1: For Britain as a whole the first six columns sum to 0% and show the changing proportion of the electorate voting for each party. 2: The final column shows the change in the electorate as a proportion of the 1992 electorate and hence represents a combination of the effects of net migration and voter registration and non-registration in each decile group.
The general election of 1997 was not won by Labour but was lost by the Conservatives. Nationally (New) Labour increased their vote (as a share of the electorate) by only 4%, while the Conservative vote fell by 11%. However, Labour were very careful to ensure that they won votes in the right places, whereas the Conservatives lost them most where they needed them most. It appears likely that most former Conservative voters who chose not to vote for that party abstained and so the national abstention rate rose by 6% of the electorate between 1992 and 1997. The Liberal Democrats lost 2% of their support while other parties (mainly the referendum party, who won votes from the Conservatives) gained 2%.
As Table 8 shows both the national swings of the electorate and what the swings were in each of the ten decile groups, it is possible to see how parts of the country with different excess mortality rates changed their votes. The rise in abstentions was quite uniform across the decile groups. It is likely that this was the result of abstentions rising in poor areas due to dissatisfaction with the political process and in rich areas where voters who not Conservative but could not bring themselves to vote for any party. The Labour Party's swing was strongest where it needed the votes most, in decile 6 areas, where many votes were required to win what were thought to be safe Conservative seats. Their vote swing was weakest in the areas where they already held most of the seats, in the decile 1 group of constituencies, with the poorest health. These were also the areas where the Conservatives lost fewest votes. The poor (in terms of health among other measures) did not swing to Labour half (or even a quarter as much) as the richer voters did in 1997. Finally column 7 of the table shows how the electorates of the constituencies in each group changed over the five years. The areas with the highest premature mortality ratios lost the most registered voters, while the number of potential voters increased in the areas now largely represented by Conservative MPs. It is difficult to disentangle the factors behind this shift in the registered population. A combination of natural change (births less deaths), migration effects and changes in the propensity of adults to register to vote will all have contributed.
Conclusion
The relationship between voting, premature mortality and political representation in Britain is remarkably close. The recent polarization in mortality rates by area and the swings in the marginals seats at the last general election made that relationship even clearer than before. The poorer half of Britain votes for the Labour Party and dies earlier. The poorest tenth of Britain dies earliest and now supports some of the most powerful politicians in this country through their votes. Are the politicians likely to try to reduce this level of inequality in life chances? The 1979-1997 Conservative government had little direct incentive or experience to attempt this. Their constituents were unlikely to present stories about their lives that made the reality of health polarization evident and this was most true of the constituents of that party's leaders. Conservative MPs where probably unaware of the differences in health to be found across Britain, and if they were aware I suspect that they blamed this on the behaviour of people they were unlikely to have ever met and whose political support they never relied on.
The story with (New) Labour should be different. It is hard to believe that Members of Parliament, some of whom have represented their constituencies for many years, are not aware that their constituents tend to live very much poorer lives than themselves and certainly have much higher chances of dying young than the MPs themselves do. Many MPs do not live in their constituency, of course, and some may not care at all about their constituents, other than requiring their votes every five years. If they do know their constituents well they may still not be aware that in other parts of the country life chances are so much better. However, to date the Labour government has not committed itself to any actions which are likely to narrow the gap in life chances between their constituents and the rest of British society. They have made an enormous number of token gestures and many, many speeches, but none of these can have an effect of any relevance. For instance, Health Action Zones: even if their introduction reduced mortality to the average for Britain in the proposed areas, the areas are too small to have any significant effect on the national pattern of inequality. The Green Paper's targets for health do not focus on inequality, indeed these new targets could all be met without any reduction in the level of inequality in health in Britain. The independent enquiry into inequalities in health has brought little that is new to the debate and has not presented what was known before with any degree of force. New Labour may care, but so far they do not appear to care enough to act decisively.
At the root of inequalities in health are inequalities in wealth, poverty, income and opportunity. This has been known for long enough. Unfortunately those without wealth, with low incomes and little opportunity are unlikely to punish their political representatives if the latter do not improve their life chances. Those who are poor and left-leaning have no party to vote for now that Labour has moved to the centre. They are a captive set of Labour supporters and can hence be ignored. Instead it is, as Figure 5 shows, the middle fifth of the country in terms of health (and by inference wealth) who determine which party is in power. The constituencies in decile groups 5 and 6 are the most marginal politically and have standardized mortality ratios that are close to the national average.
Since the second world war, the rich have always elected Conservative MPs while the poor have always elected Labour MPs. The Liberals have confused this pattern only slightly. The last election did not alter that pattern, but it did, through the rhetoric of its campaign, and the subsequent actions of its victors, show that the real concern of the party of the poorest had shifted to the centre, to the average, to the voters who live in areas where the chances of dying young are already close to the national average. In terms of winning elections in Britain, inequality is not an issue amongst the voters who matter most. They are, on average, neither rich nor poor, healthy or unhealthy. To them, initiating un-targeted action, such as "reducing waiting lists" nationally, to raise the general level of any service or condition is most likely to be beneficial. Squeezing "fat cats" and "scroungers" simultaneously will be most popular. The policy makers of the present government appear to agree. Their actions suggest that they believe that Ms/Mr Average is not interested in inequality and Ms/Mr Average matters most. It is rare to be average, in that most people in Britain aren't, or don't live in "average areas". Thus policy to suit the average is policy for the few rather than the many.
